Biosecurity

Argentine Ants

Sea Containers Background Information

MAF QUESTIONS

Are there any other ways, apart from those identified in the discussion document, that you consider could be applied to the sea container pathway to reduce associated biosecurity risks?

Your chance to suggest some bright ideas!

Do you consider that non-MAF persons should be able to carry out checks on containers, subject to suitable training and audits? Why or why not?

No. Inspections should be treated as a core government service and not privatised or subcontracted out. They are a core part of the policing of biosecurity.

What formal controls, if any, do you consider should be placed on the movement of uncleared containers within New Zealand?

Uncleared containers should not be able to be moved around New Zealand as they pose a biosecurity risk.

Should there be any pest surveillance at locations where unpacked containers are stored? Why or why not?

Yes, pest surveillance has proved to be valuable in locating invasive ants and the Asian gypsy moth. It is likely that some pests find their way through the border control system.

What costs should be borne by industry? What costs should be borne by Government?

A ‘polluter pays’ rather than ‘victim pays’ approach should be adopted. This means increasing the extent to which the importing sector contributes to the cost of biosecurity. Keeping goods pest-free is part of the core business of importers.

How should compliance with the proposed risk mitigation strategy be enforced?

A regime of fines with strict liability should applied to commercial importers to encourage compliance and recover costs that arise from non-compliance.

MAF’S PROPOSED MEASURES

4.2.1 Biosecurity Awareness Material

Support. Providing information to people about the need for biosecurity is important to raise awareness. People from other countries do not necessarily share the concerns and awareness of people in New Zealand and even New Zealanders do not behave as responsibly as one might expect given the level of awareness about biosecurity. It is particularly important that overseas importers and shipping companies and their staff are made aware of why biosecurity is so important.

4.2.2 Offshore Certification

Support. However, offshore certification is unreliable and needs to be backed up with inspections in New Zealand and auditing of certification processes.

4.2.4 Intelligence-based Electronic Risk Profiling System

Support. Shipping manifests are unreliable. An electronic system would be more efficient and enable more accurate information to be recorded. The limitations of information systems need to be recognized: electronic risk profiling must be backed up by audits and inspections.

4.2.5 External Visual Inspection

All shipping containers should be given 6-sided inspections to ensure that they are free of contaminants, or if dirty, contamination is located and removed.

4.2.6 External Decontamination and Inspection Systems for Containers

Effective systems for decontaminating shipping containers should be developed.

4.2.7 Chemical and Heat Treatments

Where non-chemical treatment is effective, it would be preferable to chemical treatment. Priority for resources should be in inspection with the cleaning of those containers that are contaminated. Cleaning methods need to be thorough to be effective. External cleaning should cover six sides and pay particular regard to undersides.

4.2.8 X-ray Screening of Containers

It is doubtful whether this is of value for anything other than human smuggling. The development of x-ray screening should not be a priority. Priority should be given to inspections when unpacking and six-sided inspection on arrival.

4.2.9 Supervision of Container Unpacking

Support. All containers should be inspected when being unpacked. This would significantly minimize the risk of new pests escaping and becoming established. Inspections should be carried out by a government employee, not an employee of the unpacking facility.

4.2.10 Enhanced Compliance Strategy

Supported

4.2.11 Surveillance at Biosecurity Hazard Sites

Surveillance at biosecurity hazard sites is supported. Pests will inevitably be missed in inspections and cleaning regimes or arrive through unconventional or unexpected means. Surveillance provides an important back up to failures ‘higher up’ the chain.

IMPORT HEALTH STANDARD - KEY POINTS

• Import health standards are rules that apply to imports to reduce the biosecurity risk. MAF is proposing an import health standard to apply to sea containers.
• All inspections should be carried out by government employees.
• Containers should be given a full external inspection (and be cleaned if necessary) before being moved beyond the port.
• Storage areas for shipping containers should be on a hard surface, away from waterbodies and vegetation.
• All shipping containers should be inspected when being offloaded to reduce the risk of new incursions.
• Effective alternatives to methyl bromide need to be developed in order to reduce the use of this environmentally harmful chemical.
• Persons and companies responsible for causing incursions through a breach of the import health standard or the Biosecurity Act should have to pay for the cost of the incursion response.
• Significant breaches of the import health standard by a registered site where containers are opened should result in the loss of registration.
  

This page was updated on 15 April, 2005